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Elliott Ashton Welsh II was convicted 1 for refusing to submit to
induction into the Armed Forces in violation of the Selective Service
Act of 1948,2 and on June 1, 1966 was sentenced to three years imprisonment for the violation. It took more than four years and a highly
doubtful decision for Welsh to be finally vindicated.
Welsh had been brought up in a religious atmosphere, attending
church during his childhood, but belonged to no religious organization at the time of his involvement with the Selective Service. After
registering for the draft, he applied for conscientious objector status
under Section 6(j) of the Selective Service Act of 1948.3 However,
before signing the Selective Service form which contained the words
"I am, by reason of my religious training and belief, conscientiously
opposed to participation in war in any form," Welsh struck the words
"religious training and." He believed that killing in war was wrong,
unethical, and immoral, and his conscience would not let him take
part in it; in the minds of the members of the Selective Service Board
there was no doubt as to the sincerity of his objection. Welsh, however,
was denied his exemption because his Appeal Board and the Department of Justice hearing officer could find no religious basis for the
registrant's belief, opinions, and convictions. Welsh contended, as a
defense to his subsequent prosecution, that he was entitled to an
exemption from combatant and noncombatant service under the provisions of Section 6(j) because he was "by reason of religious training
and belief . . . conscientiously opposed to participation in war in
1 United States v. Welsh, No. 36138 (S.D. Cal., decided June 1, 1966).
2 Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, § 12(a), 62 Stat. 622, as amended 50 U.S.C. app.
(Supp. 1970). This section provides in part:
Any member of the Selective Service System or any other person charged as
herein provided with the duty of carrying out any of the provisions of this title
... who in any manner shall knowingly fail or neglect or refuse to perform any
duty required of him under . . . this title . . . shall, upon conviction . . . be

punished by imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine of not more
than $10,000, or by both ....
3 Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 612, as amended 50 U.S.C. app. § 4560)
(Supp. 1970). This section provides in part:
Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any person
to be subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United
States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed
to participation in war in any form. Religious training and belief in this connection means an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving
duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but does not include
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any form."1
Welsh's conviction was affirmed, 5 and certiorari granted.6
The Supreme Court, Justice Black writing the majority opinion, reversed Welsh's conviction on the ground that, although his beliefs were
ethical or moral in source, 7 they were deeply and seriously held, and
occupied in his life a place parallel to that filled by God in traditionally religious persons. On this basis and the conclusion of the
court of appeals that he held his beliefs "with the strength of more
traditional religious convictions, ' 8 the Court concluded that Welsh
was entitled to an exemption within the scope of Section 6(j).
In reviewing Welsh's conviction, the Supreme Court affirmed its
adherence to the view it expounded in an earlier Section 6(j) case,
United States v. Seeger.9 In Seeger, a case similar in its facts to the
present case, the Court stated that the task is to decide whether the
beliefs professed by a registrant are sincerely held and whether they are
"in his own scheme of things, religious." 10 The Court in Welsh stated:

If an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are purely
ethical or moral in source and content but that nevertheless impose
upon him a duty of conscience to refrain from participating in any
war at any time, those beliefs certainly occupy in the life of that
individual "a place parallel to that filled by ... God" in traditionally religious persons. Because his beliefs function as a religion in
his life, such an individual is as much entitled to a "religious" conscientious objector exemption under § 6(j) as is someone who derives his conscientious opposition to war from traditional religious
convictions."1
essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely personal
moral code.
4 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 335 (1970). Although he originally characterized his beliefs as nonreligious, Welsh later wrote a letter to his Appeal Board in which
he declared that his beliefs were "certainly religious in the ethical sense of the word,"
and that he believed the taking of life to be morally wrong.
Id. at 341.
5 Welsh v. United States, 404 F.2d 1078 (9th Cir. 1968).
6 396 U.S. 816 (1969).
7 398 U.S. at 343.
8 404 F.2d at 1081.
9 380 U.S. 163 (1965). See also I SErON HALL L. REV. 167 (1970).
10 380 U.S. at 185. To determine if the registrant's beliefs function as a religion in
his life within the meaning of § 6(j), the Court set out a test:
The test might be stated in these words: A sincere and meaningful belief
which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the
God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within the statutory
definition.
Id. at 176. Moreover, the sincere and meaningful belief is not confined to traditional concepts of religion, and local boards and courts are not free to reject beliefs because they
consider them incomprehensible. Id. at 184-85.
11 398 U.S. at 340.
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The substance of the Welsh decision, then, is that it is no longer
necessary for a conscientious objector to maintain and hold religious
beliefs in the traditional sense of the world "religious" in order to
qualify for the privilege 12 of exemption from service in the Armed
Forces. This rule applies even though the registrant himself would
characterize his beliefs as being "nonreligious," as did Welsh. 13 As a
result of this decision, a registrant may now qualify for the exemption
if his views are moral, ethical or religious in source or content.
The issue of conscientious objection based on religious training
and belief has long been present in this country, its history extending
back to colonial times. The Federal Government became involved in
the issue of conscientious objection during the period of the Civil
War and again during World War I. 1 4 In those times a conscientious
objector, in order to qualify for exemption, had to prove he was a
member of a pacifist religious group which prohibited members from
serving in the military or participating in war in any form.'3 During
World War II, the concept was broadened to include registrants whose
claims for exemption were based on religious training and belief, it
no longer being necessary to be a member of a pacifist group.' 6 This
concept was further broadened in 1948 when Congress amended the
language of the statute, providing that a registrant's claim for exemp17
tion should be grounded on belief in relation to a "Supreme Being."'
12 United States v. Carson, 282 F. Supp. 261, 268 (E.D. Ark. 1968):
Exemption from combatant or noncombatant service in the armed forces on
the grounds of conscientious objection is not derived from any constitutional
right, but rather is a matter of congressional grace; exemption is actually a
privilege rather than a right.
See also 1 SETroN HALL L Rv.at 170 (1970).
18 398 U.S. at 341:
[Flew registrants are fully aware of the broad scope of the word "religious"
as used in § 6(j), and accordingly a registrant's statement that his beliefs are
nonreligious is a highly unreliable guide for those charged with administering
the exemption.
14 E. WIGHT, CoNscIErNous OnjEcroRs IN THE Cnu. WAR 40 (1931); CoNsCMeNCE IN
AMERucA 18, 88 (L. Schlissel ed. 1968).
15 Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 78. This section provides in part:
[N]othing in this Act contained shall be construed to require or compel any
person to serve in any of the forces herein provided for who is found to be a
member of any well-recognized religious sect or organization at present organized
and existing and whose existing creed or principles forbid its members to
participate in war in any form ....
16 Act of September 16, 1940, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 889. This section provides in part:
Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to require any person to be
subject to combatant training and service in the land or naval forces of the
United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously
opposed to participation in war in any form.
17 See note 3 supra.

1970]

NO TES

The Seeger decision removed the requirement of belief in a supreme being and extended exemption to the registrant as long as his
claim was based on a sincere and meaningful belief which paralleled
a belief in God. Congress subsequently amended the statute in 1967
and deleted reference to a supreme being.'8 However, under Seeger,
and prior to this decision, a registrant's beliefs still had to be religious
in nature. This latest decision completely eliminates any requirement
or necessity for a religious basis to a registrant's conscientious objection to military service.
In announcing its decision, the Court made clear that it was not
passing upon the constitutional argument that Section 6(j) violates
the establishment clause of the first amendment in that it distinguishes between theistic and nontheistic beliefs, extending exemption
to those who profess a religious basis for their beliefs. 20 Justice Harlan,
however, in a separate opinion dealt with that issue and on the basis
that there was, in fact, a violation of the first amendment, concurred
with the majority in reversing Welsh's conviction. Harlan felt that
the guides to be used when interpreting a congressional statute are
its usage and legislative history, and that in the case of Section 60) the
only interpretation consistent with its legislative history is that it
draws a distinction between theistic and nontheistic beliefs. He considered it "a remarkable feat of judicial surgery to remove, as did
Seeger, the theistic requirement of § 6(j), ' 2 1 and felt that in the present
decision the Court completely misinterpreted the statute.
For Harlan, the constitutional question is whether a statute that
draws a distinction between theistic and nontheistic beliefs, and defers
to the individual's conscience only when his beliefs are theistic in
nature, is compatible with the establishment clause of the first amend18 50 U.S.C. app. § 4560) (Supp. 1970). This section provides in part:
Nothing contained in this title . . . shall be construed to require any person
to be subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the
United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously
opposed to participation in war in any form.
19 Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (concurring opinion):
The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which
the case may be disposed of.
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 444 (1968) (concurring opinion):
Even in this age of rapid constitutional change, the Court has continued to
proclaim adherence to the principle that decision of constitutional issues should
be avoided wherever possible.
20 U.S. CONST. amend. L This amendment provides in part:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....
21 398 U.S. at 351.
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ment. His opinion was that any such distinction is incompatible with
this amendment and therefore that Welsh's conviction should have
been reversed as inconsistent with the establishment clause. 22 But
Harlan accepted the decision of the majority, and its conscientious
objector test, on the basis that it cured the fundamental defect of
Section 6(j), that of "underinclusion." He felt that the "radius" of
Section 6(j) should be determined by the conscientiousness with which
an individual opposes war in general, and that the statute, as construed
prior to this decision, excluded individuals who should have been
included-individuals motivated by teachings of nontheistic religions
and "individuals guided by an inner ethical voice that bespeaks secular
and not 'religious' reflection. ' 23 For legislation to conform with the
requirements of the first amendment it must, at the very least, be
24
neutral.
Justice White, in his dissenting opinion, stated that he could not
join the majority in exempting from the draft those who disclaim
religious objections to war and whose views are purely personal. White
felt that to exempt these individuals would be to include a class of
persons within the purview of Section 6(j) to whom Congress specifically denied an exemption; White would deny Welsh his exemption
on the ground that he did not qualify as having "religious" beliefs.2 5
The effect of this decision is that it will enable a person to be
exempted from military service if he has strong moral, ethical or religious objections to war in any form. The decision raises as many
questions as it answers, however, not the least of which is the interpretation of a "strong moral belief" or a "strong ethical belief." Who
is to judge these beliefs? By what standards will the judgment be made?
The Director of the Selective Service System, Dr. Curtis W. Tarr,
issued guidelines to the local draft boards to assist them in deciding
which young men are entitled to conscientious objector status.26 The

essential factor for a board to consider when evaluating a claim is
whether the belief is sincere and deeply held, and not whether it is
comprehensible to the board members; further, the applicant must
hold his beliefs with the strength of traditional religious convictions,
and must demonstrate that his ethical or moral convictions were
gained through training, study, contemplation, or other activity comparable in vigor and dedication to the processes by which traditional
22
23
24
25
20

Id. at 362.
Id. at 357.
Id. at 361. See also 1 SE'roN HALL L. REv. at 168 (1970).
398 U.S. at 367.
N.Y. Times, July 7, 1970, at I, col. 3.
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religious convictions are formulated. 27 This undoubtedly will place a
heavy burden on the members of the draft boards, since they will have
to judge and evaluate a registrant's claims without the benefit of objective criteria as were formerly available, e.g., the fact of membership
in a religious group or organization. The test of sincerity, however, is
not a new test 2 8 and in most cases the boards will probably have had

some experience in dealing with previous claims that required a
judgment as to the claimant's sincerity. However, the burden will
remain upon the members of the local draft boards to ascertain which
objectors are sincere and which are not. The end result will probably
be a wide variation in interpretation of the Court's ruling and the
guidelines as issued by Dr. Tarr.
One problem that perhaps will develop, and which has been
acknowledged by Dr. Tarr as likely to do so, is that of discrimination
against uneducated men who have not had access to ethical and
philosophical writings. 29 Dr. Tan- has urged that the draft boards be

aware of this problem and "make every effort" not to give "particular
advantage to a registrant who is learned or glib."8 0
The result reached in this decision is most acceptable; however,
the reasoning used by the Court in reaching this result is not. In
order to "save" Section 6(j) and not have to rule on the constitutional
issue involved, Justice Black applied too broad an interpretation to
the crucial word "religious." Interpreting the word to include not only
religious views in the conventional sense but also ethical and moral
views was to completely change the meaning and intention of the
section and remove it from the context of its past usage and legislative
history. In order to achieve this result the majority disregarded the
fact that Welsh himself denied that his views were religious and further stated that he did not fully understand the broad scope of the
word religious as used in Section 6(j).
Clearly, as pointed out by the concurring opinion of Justice
Harlan 31 and the dissenting opinion of Judge Hamley in the court of
appeals, 3 2 the constitutional question was present and should have been
Id.
Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 381 (1955):
The ultimate question in conscientious objector cases is the sincerity of the
registrant in objecting, on religious grounds, to participation in war in any form.
See also United States v. Carson, 282 F. Supp. 261, 269 (E.D. Ark. 1968) (registrants sincerely
opposed on religious grounds to military service are entitled to Selective Service exemption).
29 N.Y. Times, July 7, 1970, at 1, col. I.
30 Id. at 7, col. 1.
31 398 U.S. at 345.
32 404 F.2d at 1087 (9th Cir. 1968).
27

28
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decided. An evaluation of the history of Section 60) leads inescapably
to the conclusion that it afforded. the privilege of exemption from
military service only to those persons whose conscientious objection to
all wars was predicated upon some sort of religious training and belief,
and denied the exemption to those persons whose beliefs were nontheistic in nature. This is clearly a violation of the establishment clause
of the first amendment. The Court should have addressed itself to and
decided the case on the strength of this issue.
Frank V. Burke

